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The Case of the Phantom  MTB
and the Loss of 
HMCS A th abaskan
M ichael Whitby
In  the  early daw n h o u rs  of 29 April 1944, the destroyer HMCS A th a b a ska n  p lunged  to the 
depths of the English Channel, her hull wracked 
by two powerful explosions. One h u n d red  and  
tw enty-eight young C anad ians died w ith her. 
Fifty-two years later, in  the  article “I Will Never 
Forget the Sound of Those Engines Going Away: 
A R e-exam ination into the  S inking of HMCS 
A thabaskan” th a t appeared in this journal, Peter 
D ixon a d v a n c e d  th e  th e o ry  -  w h ic h  w as 
p resen ted  as fact -  th a t  the  second explosion, 
the  one th a t  sealed  the  destroyer’s fate, w as 
caused  by a torpedo fired by a B ritish  m otor 
to rp ed o  b o a t (MTB).2 The m o st s ig n ifican t 
w arsh ip  loss in  C anad ian  naval h istory, the 
theory  goes, w as caused  by friendly fire.3 T hat 
is no t so. W hen prim ary evidence overlooked by 
Dixon is considered an d  the recollections of 
w itnesses recorded decades after the  event are 
scru tin ized , it becom es ab u n d an tly  clear th a t 
A thabaskan  could no t have been  the victim of a 
B ritish  torpedo.
Before getting into the specifics of the issue, 
it is im portant to set ou t the events of th a t night. 
T h roughou t the  sp ring  of 1944 Allied naval 
forces carried out anti-shipping sweeps to erode 
G erm an naval s tren g th  in  p repara tion  for the 
invasion of no rthw est Europe. They also laid 
offensive m inefields a t stra teg ic  locations to 
im pede Kriegsmarine sorties once the invasion 
w as  la u n c h e d . P ly m o u th  C o m m a n d  w as  
responsible for m ounting a good portion of these 
o p e r a t io n s ,  a n d  C a n a d ia n  T r ib a l  c la s s  
destroyers, w hich h a d  jo ined  the com m and in 
J a n u a ry  1944, were heavily involved in bo th .4
It w as n o t u n u su a l, therefore, for HMCS 
H aida  an d  A th a b a ska n  to lea rn  d u rin g  the  
forenoon of 28 April th a t they h ad  been  ordered 
to screen  HOSTILE 26, a m inelaying m ission 
off the F rench  coast abou t a  100 m iles so u th  of 
Plym outh.5 The Tribals’ role was to act as d istan t 
covering force for eight Motor L aunches (MLs) 
of the  10th ML Flotilla th a t  were to lay m ines 
abou t n ine m iles n o rth  of the  e a ste rn  po in t of 
the  lie de B as.6 Two MTBs were to provide close 
e sco rt to  th e  m in e lay ers , w ith  L ie u te n a n t-  
C om m ander T.N. C artw righ t, RNVR, sen io r 
officer of th e  5 2 n d  MTB F lo tilla  r id in g  in  
MTB-677, in  com m and of b o th  the  m inelaying 
g ro u p  a s  w ell a s  th e  two covering  MTBs. 
C a r tw rig h t led  h is  fo rce o u t th ro u g h  th e  
P lym outh  boom  a t 1946 h o u rs . H aida  an d  
A th a b a ska n , w ith  C om m ander H.G. DeWolf, 
RCN as sen io r officer, followed a t 2300 h o u rs  
w ith o rders to pa tro l a 12-mile, east-w est ‘race 
tra c k ’ a t 49° N, 4° 10' W, ab o u t 12 m iles no rth - 
no rthw est from  w here the  m inefield would be 
laid. C onditions were good, w ith a gentle Force 
3 wind blowing ou t of the north, a calm  sea state  
2, an d  good visibility.7
As the C anadian destroyers headed towards 
th e ir  pa tro l position , abnorm al a tm ospheric  
conditions enabled the coastal radar a t Plymouth 
C om m and to detect two enem y vessels off the 
F rench  coast.8 From  0010 h o u rs  to 0130 hours 
the Area Com bined H eadquarters , Plym outh 
p lo t te d  th e  p r o g r e s s  “of e n e m y  v e s s e ls  
proceeding to the westward a t 20 knots.” At 0258 
hours contact was regained, and  a t 0307 hours, 
th e  C -in -C  P ly m o u th , A d m ira l S ir  R a lp h  
L eatham , ordered H aida  an d  A th a b a ska n  to
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The Unlucky Lady. HMCS Athabaskan at anchor at Plymouth in the spring of 1944.
proceed sou thw est a t  full speed  to Intercept. 
From  here, C om m ander DeW olfs after action  
report can  be u sed  to outline the  events th a t 
followed:
.. .C om m ander-in -C h ief P lym outh ’s  29 0 3 0 7  w as 
received in  th e  p lo t a t  0322 . C o u rse  w as a lte red  
to 225° a n d  sp e e d  In c re a se d  to  m ax im u m . At 
03 3 2  co u rse  w as a lte red  to  205° a n d  a t  03 4 3  to 
1 8 0°. I t w a s  e s t im a te d  fro m  in f o rm a t io n  
co n ta in ed  in  C-in-C ’s 29 0 3 1 3  a n d  0331 th a t  th e  
enem y could  be in tercep ted  E a s t of Isle de Vierge
6. R a d a r  c o n ta c t w as g a in ed  b y  A th a b a sk a n  
a t  0359° b e a rin g  133°, 14 m iles a n d  confirm ed  
b y  H a id a  a t  0 4 0 2  w h en  a n  en em y  re p o r t w as 
m ad e . C o u rse  w as  a lte re d  to  160° a t  0 4 0 0  a n d  
b a c k  to  170° a t  0 408 , th e  b e a rin g  o f th e  enem y  
rem a in in g  s te a d y  a t  a b o u t 125°. At 0 4 0 2  p lo t 
e s tim a te d  enem y  co u rse  a n d  sp e e d  280°, 24 
k n o ts  a n d  th is  w as  con firm ed  by  A th a b a sk a n  
(278°, 23  kno ts).
7. At 04 0 7  th e  enem y bore  127°, 13000 yards, 
co u rse  260°, 24  k n o ts  a n d  p lo t re co rd ed  th a t  
we w ere two m iles c lea r of [minefield] QZX 1287.
At 0411 A th a b a sk a n  rep o rted  3 echoes a n d  th is  
w as  con firm ed  by  Type 271  w ho re p o r te d  th e  
th ird  echo  a s  sm aller.
8. At 0412  I gave the  o rder “engage th e  enem y" 
a n d  o p en ed  fire w ith  s t a r  she ll, th e  ran g e  th e n  
b e in g  7 3 0 0  ya rd s . At 0 4 1 4  tw o d e s tro y e rs  w ere 
in  s ig h t, b e a rin g  115° a n d  w ere recogn ized  as  
E lb ings.9
9. T he enem y  la id  sm oke  a n d  tu rn e d  aw ay  to 
th e  S o u th w ard . A t 04 1 7  co u rse  w as a lte red  30° 
to  p o rt, still k eep in g  “A” a rc s  o p en  a n d  a t  th is  
m o m en t A th a b a sk a n  w as h it  a ft a n d  a  large fire 
s ta r te d . S h e  w as observed  to  slow  dow n a n d  
tu r n e d  to p o rt. T he firs t h it  on  th e  enem y  w as 
o b ta in ed  a t  0418 .
10. At 0 4 1 9  H aid a  a lte re d  co u rse  90° to p o rt 
a n d  lay  a  sm oke  sc re e n  for A th a b a sk a n  w ho 
a p p e a re d  to  b e  s to p p e d  a n d  b ad ly  o n  fire. “A" 
a rc s  w ere opened  to  s ta rb o a rd . At 04 2 0  a n o th e r  
h it  w as observed  on  th e  enem y.
11. At 0422  p lo t repo rted  enem y steam ing  160° 
in  line ab reas t. At a b o u t th is  m om en t th e  enem y 
n o t b e in g  engaged  w as  s ig h ted  b ro a d  on  th e  
s ta rb o a rd  bow  s te e rin g  from  left to  rig h t a n d  
ta rg e t  w a s  sh if te d . T he f i r s t  d e s tro y e r  w as  
d isap p ea rin g  in  sm oke to  th e  E astw ard . C ourse  
w as a ltered  to  th e  s ta rb o a rd  p lacing the  engaged 
enem y on  th e  bow  a n d  th e  o th e r ah ead . At 0427  
“X” g u n  re p o r te d  s t a r  sh e ll ex p en d ed  a n d  a  
m o m en t la te r  A th a b a sk a n  a p p ea red  to  blow  up . 
F o rtu n a te ly  a t  th is  b la c k  m o m en t th e  engaged  
enem y w as on  fire a n d  th o u g h  h id d en  by sm oke, 
th e  glow of th e  fire w as b rig h t en o u g h  to  provide 
a  p o in t of a im .10
H aida  b a tte red  th is  target, w hich proved to be 
th e  G erm an  d e s tro y e r  T-27, for five m ore 
m in u tes  before DeWolf realized it w as h a rd  
ag round  on lie de Vierge. H aida  th en  headed  
northw est to search  for the o ther destroyer, b u t 
as con tac t h a d  been  lost DeWolf broke off the
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search  an d  re tu rn ed  to w here A th a b a ska n  h ad  
la s t been  seen. All th a t  w as found w as “a large 
g roup of su rv iv o rs.”11 S h a tte re d  by th e  two 
explosions observed from H aida , A th a b a ska n  
was gone.
The cause of the first explosion th a t crippled 
A th a b a ska n  a t 0417 h o u rs  is no t in  doubt. It 
cam e from  a  to rpedo  fired  by  th e  G erm an  
destroyer T-24 as it tu rn e d  away e a stw ard .12 It 
is the  cause  of the  second explosion, the  one 
th a t fin ished h e r off (although she  probably  
w o u ld  hav e  s u n k  anyw ay) t h a t  h a s  b e e n  
questioned. According to official investigations 
a t the  tim e, and  su b seq u e n t exam ination  by 
h isto rian s , the  large fire th a t  b u rn ed  o u t of 
control after the  first explosion led to a chain  of 
events th a t  caused  the second, and  by virtually 
all accoun ts , m ore powerful in te rn a l explosion 
a t 0427 hours.
Peter Dixon disagrees. He believes th a t  a t 
0307 hours, MTB-677 copied Plym outh’s signal 
ordering Haida  and  A thabaskan  to intercept the 
enem y rad a r  contact. After a 55 -m inu te  ru n  a t 
30 knots, M TB-677 arrived a t the  scene in  tim e 
to be p icked  u p  as the  th ird  r a d a r  co n tac t 
detected by the Tribals a t 0411 hours. The flash 
from T-24’s torpedo h itting  A thabaskan  a t 0417 
hou rs  acted  as a  beacon th a t led the MTB to the 
C a n a d ia n  d e s tro y e r . T h e n , c o n fu s e d  by  
A th a b a sk a n ’s cam ouflage p a tte rn , M TB-677  
m istook the  Tribal for a  G erm an destroyer and  
attacked , killing a sailor on the  fo’c’sle w ith 
m ach ine gun  fire an d  m ortally  w ounding h e r 
w ith a torpedo.
For the above to be true , a  docum en t lying 
in the Public Record Office in Kew, England h as  
to be false. Indeed, it an d  all its p a rts  m u st be 
complete fabrications. This is the “Report by the 
Senior Officer, 52nd MTB Flotilla, of proceedings 
of Operation ‘Hostile Twenty Six.’” Dated 30 April 
1944, th is report w as subm itted  by L ieutenant- 
C om m ander T.N. C artw righ t, RNVR, sen io r 
officer of the  52nd  MTB Flotilla, who as already 
noted, w as riding in  M TB-677 th a t  n ig h t.13 As 
sen io r officer of the  m inelaying force and  the 
tw o M TBs p ro v id in g  c lo se  p r o te c t io n ,  
C a r tw rig h t’s d u ty  w as to  e n s u re  th a t  th e  
m inefield was laid effectively and  accurately, to 
screen  the  MLs doing the  work, an d  th en  to 
escort the  MLs safely hom e. This is h is account 
of MTB-677’s m ovem ents a t the time Peter Dixon 
says he w as torpedoing A thabaskan:
C o m m a n d e r- in -C h le fs  2 9 0 3 0 7  a n d  2 9 0 3 1 3  
w ere received a t  0315  a n d  0323  respectively an d  
it  w a s  rea lized  th a t  en em y  p lo t w as p ro b ab ly  
d e s tro y e rs  b u t  R a d a r  sw eep  to  th e  so u th w a rd  
p ro d u ced  no  c o n ta c t n o r  w as  an y th in g  sigh ted .
A t 0 3 3 8  C .ln  C’s 29 0 3 3 1  w as  received  ju s t  a s  
[m ine lay ing ] D iv is io n s re jo in e d  a n d  a lte re d  
co u rse  to  N.6°E. for re tu rn  p a ssa g e  a t  14 k no ts .
At 04 0 5  H a id a ’s  2 9 0 4 0 2  w as received a n d  04 1 0  
c o n tin u o u s  s t a r  sh e ll w a s  s ig h te d  b e a r in g  
a p p ro x im a te ly  S.45°W ; H a id a ’s 2 9 0 4 1 4  w as  
received  a n d  a t  0 4 1 6  a n  exp lo s ion  w as  s ig h ted  
followed by a  b u rs t  of flam e bearing  S.55°W. This 
w as  follow ed a t  0 4 2 7  b y  a  very  large exp losion  
w ith  a  la rge  w hite  m u sh ro o m  of w h ite  sm oke  
on  approxim ately  th e  sam e bearing; it w as feared 
th a t  a t  th e  tim e  th a t  th is  exp lo s ion  e m a n a te d  
from  one of th e  destro y er su p p o r t force. At 0505  
C .in  C’s  2 9 0 4 4 8  w as received o rd erin g  MTBs to 
d e ta c h  a n d  p ro ceed  to  re s c u e  of su rv iv o rs  of 
A th a b a sk a n ; MTBs p ro ceed ed  to  th e  S.W. a t  20  
k n o ts  u n ti l  C. in  C ’s 2 9 0 5 3 7  o rd e rin g  th e m  to 
r e tu rn  to  P lym outh . C o n tac t w as re -es tab lish ed  
w ith  M .L.s a t  0 8 3 8  a n d  force e n te re d  h a rb o u r  
a t  0 9 5 5 .14
Supplem enting Cartw right’s report is a  two- 
page ex tract from  M TB-677’s deck log for 2 8 /2 9  
April 1944. This docum ent, w hich details the 
position, course and  speed of MTB-677 over the 
course  of the  operation  as well as  the  position  
of the  m ine lay, w as com pleted a s  the  m ission 
unfolded an d  th u s  can  be tak en  as the  m ost 
reliable acco u n t of the  MTB’s m ovem ents. The 
original log would have rem ained  w ith the MTB 
an d  a n  ex trac t su b m itted  so th a t  P lym outh 
C om m and would know  the  precise location of 
the  new  m inefield.15 The deck log dem onstra tes 
conclusively th a t Cartwright never deviated from 
his orders for HOSTILE 26. He stayed  w ith the 
MLs over the course of the entire operation, and  
did n o t head  for the  location of the  destroyer 
action until 0505 when C-in-C Plymouth ordered 
MTBs 677  an d  717  to rescue  A th a b a sk a n ’s 
surv ivors.16
Conspiracy theorists will argue th a t both  the 
log an d  the  repo rt could have been  altered  or 
falsified to cover up  w hat ‘really’ happened  th a t 
n ig h t.17 For th a t  to be true , an d  for th a t  cover- 
u p  to  have  rem a in e d  a ir  tig h t to th is  day, 
Cartw right, Clayton, the  20-odd crew m em bers 
of MTB-677, and  the crew s of MTB-71 7 an d  the 
ten  MLs -  som eth ing  approaching  200 sailors -  
would have h a d  to lie ab o u t the  MTB’s absence 
from the  flotilla an d  th en  kep t silen t all these  
years. S taff a t HMS Black Bat, the  MTB base  a t 
P lym outh who were responsib le  for signing off
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A Fairmile D MTB -  or ‘Dogboat’ -  similar to MTB-677.
deck logs w ould also have recognized th a t  the 
log h a d  been  altered  and  therefore been  p a rt of 
the conspiracy, as would the staff of the torpedo 
office a t P lym outh who w ould have to explain 
away a  m issing -  and  ra ther expensive -  torpedo. 
Experienced senior staff officers a t the Admiralty 
who w rote detailed  apprecia tions of the  action 
b ased  on reports  from all p a rtic ip an ts  would 
have h ad  to have been fooled by the cover-up or 
been  p a r t of it. And, of course, the  crew of the 
MTB-677, who w ould have h a d  the  loss of an  
Allied w arship and  the deaths of 128 C anadians 
on th e ir conscience, w ould have h ad  a n  even 
g reater tragedy to hide. To suggest th a t  it could 
all have been  kep t qu iet in  the first place -  let 
alone have rem ained  a secre t all th ese  years -  
seem s lu d ic ro u s. By accep ted  s ta n d a rd s  of 
h is to r ic a l  s c h o la rsh ip , th e  in fo rm a tio n  in  
Cartwright’s report and the MTB’s log proves tha t 
MTB-677 rem ained  w ith the  MLs and  did not 
go anyw here n ea r A thabaskan .
Dixon’s case loses fu rther veracity w hen one 
scru tin izes the eye-w itness testim ony he brings 
forw ard from two survivors. One sailor from  ‘A’ 
gun  on A thabaskan’s fo’c’sle deck claims to have 
w itnessed the ac tual a ttack  by MTB-677: “I saw  
the  son  of a b itch  go acro ss the  bow like a 
b anshee . I saw  the  w hite track  go into the  port 
s ide .”18 A nother describes ‘B’ g u n  being “raked
by sm all a rm s fire, killing Able S eam an  H ubert 
J . P eart.”19 According to the citations in  Dixon’s 
article, bo th  claim s were m ade in s ta tem en ts  or 
correspondence during  the m id-1980s, or 40 
years after the  action. A m ore reliable source 
would obviously be accounts taken  immediately 
after the events, and  for th a t  we can  tu rn  to the 
Board of Inquiry  into the  loss of A thabaskan .
D uring the  w ar the  RN and  the  RCN held 
form al inquiries into the destruc tion  of m ost 
w a r s h ip s  in  o r d e r  to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  
circum stances of the loss. Because A thabaskan  
w as u n d e r RN operational control, the inquiry 
w as held  u n d e r  B ritish  au sp ic e s . F o u r RN 
officers20 m ade up  the board and  on 3 May 1944 
-  four days after the  action -  they interviewed 
29  w i tn e s s e s ,  21 of w h o m  w ere  fro m  
Athabaskan. Their testim ony is on record at the 
Public Record Office b u t w as no t consu lted  by 
Peter Dixon.21 W hat he would have found would 
likely have given him  pause. The inquiry  hea rd  
te s tim o n y  from  su rv iv o rs  of A th a b a s k a n ’s 
forw ard gun  crews, from officers and  m en on 
the  b ridge, from  lookou ts , a n d  from  ra d a r  
opera to rs -  am ong o thers. B u t no t one m ade 
any reference to seeing an  MTB or any  o ther 
sm all craft a tta ck  A th a b a ska n  a t any poin t in 
the action. W hat is m ost in te resting  is th a t the 
sailor who 40 years la te r claim ed to have seen
8
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“the  son  of a b itch  go across the  bow like a 
b a n sh ee” appeared  as a w itness b u t m entioned 
no th ing  of th a t  incident:
(Q) W h a t w a s  y o u r  a c t io n  s t a t i o n  in  th e  
A th a b a sk a n ?
(A) ‘A’ g u n , sir.
(Q) W ere you  C a p ta in  of th e  g u n ?
(A) Yes, sir.
(Q) W h a t h a p p e n e d  a fte r  th e  f irs t exp losion?
(A) I re p o r te d  th e  ‘A’ g u n  o u t of a c tio n  a n d  
im m ed ia te ly  on  ch eck in g  u p  re p o r te d  it b a c k  
in  a c tio n  again .
sh ipm ates by sm all a rm s fire, as  claim ed in 
Dixon’s article, why did they  no t report it a t 
the  inqu iry?  This seem s especially  illogical 
w h en  one c o n s id e rs  th a t  th ey  w ould  have 
a ssu m ed  th a t  su c h  an  a tta ck  would have been 
m ade by an  enem y vessel. Surely, they would 
have reported  w hat they saw. T hat was, after 
all, the pu rpose  of the  inquiry. It m akes no 
sense  w hatsoever, leaving one to conclude th a t 
they did n o t see w hat they  la te r sa id  they saw, 
leaving -  again  -  no valid reason  to th in k  th a t  
a B ritish  MTB partic ipated  in  the action  or was 
responsib le  for the  second explosion.24
(Q) W h a t m ad e  you  th in k  it w as o u t o f ac tio n ?
(A) It gave s u c h  a  ja r , I re p o r te d  it w as o u t of 
a c tio n  a n d  th e n  I saw  it w as a lrigh t.
(Q) D id you  c a rry  on  firing?
(A) Yes, sir.
(Q) W hen did  you  cea se  firing?
(A) I go t a  ch eck  fire a f te r  e igh t ro u n d s .
(Q) W hen d id  th e  seco n d  exp losion  occu r?
(A) T he seco n d  exp losion  cam e ju s t  a f te r  th is  
a n d  so m eo n e  cam e u p  a n d  sa id  s ta n d  by  to 
a b a n d o n  sh ip  w as given. T hey  all s ta r te d  to 
th e ir  a b a n d o n  sh ip  s ta tio n s  a n d  so  we w en t 
b a c k  to  th e  g u n  a n d  o p en ed  fire again .
(Q) D id you  see  th e  seco n d  exp losion?
(A) No, sir.
(Q) D id you  fire a f te r  th e  seco n d  exp losion?
Besides the  evidence in  M TB-677's log and  
C artw rig h t’s repo rt, a s  well as th e  obvious 
p ro b le m s  a s so c ia te d  w ith  h is  e y e -w itn ess  
testim ony, D ixon’s theory  falls a p a rt in o ther 
areas. A lthough he h ad  not seen  the conten ts of 
ADM 19 9 /5 3 1 , he w as aw are of a sum m ary  of 
M TB-677’s m ovem ents th a t  n igh t th a t  Adm iral 
L eatham  referred to in  h is covering letter to the 
report of the  B oard of Inquiry:
Since th e  B oard  of Inquiry  sa t. a  rep o rt h a s  been  
received from  th e  C om m anding  Officer of M.T.B. 
6 7 7  [s ic ],25 w ho  w a s  in  c o m m a n d  of F orce  
“H o s tile  XXVI”, a n d  w h o  w a s  r e tu r n in g  to  
E n g lan d  from  th e  v icin ity  of th e  lie de B as on  
th e  early  m o rn in g  of 2 9 th  April, th a t  h e  saw  
tw o exp losions.
(A) I w as  firing  a t  th e  tim e. I believe I h a d  got 
aw ay  th re e  ro u n d s  b u t  I am  n o t s u re  if th re e  
w ere aw ay a f te r  th e  explosion.
W itness w ith d rew .22
As h e  w as a t  th e  tim e a  m a tte r  of som e 3 0  m iles 
to  t h e  n o r t h  e a s t w a r d  o f  H a id a  a n d  
A th a b a sk a n . h e  w as  n o t ca lled  a s  a  w itn e ss  a t  
th e  B oard  of Inqu iry .
Photo by Gilbert A. Milne, NAC PA 166532
Nary a “son of a b itch ,” nary  
a “b a n sh e e ,” n a ry  an  MTB. 
F u r th e r m o r e ,  a l th o u g h  
th r e e  s a i lo r s  w ho  w ere  
w orking  ‘A’ or ‘B’ tu r re ts  
during the action testified a t 
the  inquiry, no t one m ade 
any reference to being raked 
by  sm a ll a rm s  fire  or to 
seeing Able S eam an  Peart 
cu t dow n.23
If survivors w itnessed  a 
direct a ttack  on th e ir sh ip  
and  the death  of one of their
Vice Admiral Percy Nelles 
speaks to the Ship’s Company of 
the Athabaskan, Plymouth, 
England, 14 April 1944.
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A grim, weary Commander Harry 
Dewolf discusses the loss of 
Athabaskan with Admiral Sir Ralph 
Leatham and his staff after 
returning to Plymouth on 29 April 
1944.
H ts d e sc r ip tio n  of th e  ex p lo s ions, how ever, is 
illum ina ting . He s ta te s  in  h is  re p o r t (forw arded 
w ith  P lym outh  le tte r No. 1931/P ly . 1 6 1 8 o f2 5 th  
May, 1944, R eport on  “H ostile" O p era tion  XXIII, 
XXTV, XXV a n d  XXVI) th a t  a t  0416  “a n  explosion 
w as s ig h te d  followed by a  b u r s t  of flam e on  a 
b e a rin g  S. 5 5 s W. T h is  w as  follow ed a t  0 4 2 7  by 
a  very large explosion  w ith  a  large m u sh ro o m  of 
w h ite  sm o k e  o n  a p p ro x im a te ly  th e  s a m e  
bearing .26
This sum m aiy  is clearly based upon Cartwright’s 
report of proceedings. In a strange tw ist of logic, 
Dixon concludes th a t  C artw right’s descrip tion 
of the  n a tu re  an d  the tim ing of the  explosion 
ind icate  he w as a t the  ac tu a l site, even though  
he reported he was 30 miles away. Dixon reaches 
th is  a ssu m p tio n  on the  ra tionale  th a t  su ch  a 
detailed descrip tion of the second explosion -  a 
“large m ushroom  of white sm oke” -  proved th a t 
the MTB had  w itnessed the explosion from close 
q u a rte rs  after it h a d  torpedoed  the  h ap le ss  
A th a b a s k a n .  He a lso  q u e s t io n s  w h e th e r  
C artw right could give tim es for bo th  explosions 
th a t m atched those given by Haida  if he was not 
n ea r to their source: “Had he been  w ith ‘Hostile 
XXVT (which was exactly 30 miles away),” Dixon 
wrote, “ the  tim e of the  sigh ting  w ould be later 
and  not as precise as he claim s.” Based on this, 
and  som e bending  of the basic  laws of physics, 
D ixon concludes th a t  C artw righ t’s accu ra te  
descrip tion  of the  explosion an d  the  tim e he 
accords it “is the proof th a t MTB 677  was a t the 
scene of the engagem ent.”27
In fac t, th e  re p o rts  of severa l G erm an  
vessels operating abou t the sam e d istance from 
the  action  as  MTB-677  provided sim ilar details 
of the  explosion. Six m inesw eepers of the  24 th  
M inensuchflotille  were a b o u t 25-30  m iles to 
eastw ard at the time of the engagement, and they 
n o t  o n ly  o b s e rv e d  g u n  f la s h e s  from  th e  
engagem ent b u t recorded a m assive explosion 
an d  cloud of sm oke a t the  tim e of the  second 
explosion. Even m ore telling is the  accoun t of 
three m inesweepers of the 6 th  Minensuchflotille. 
They h a d  been  task ed  to rendezvous w ith T-24 
and  T-27  b u t  h ad  been  held up, an d  a t 0400 
h o u rs  were laying a minefield n o rth eas t of lie 
d ’O u essan t (or U shant), abou t 25 m iles so u th  
west from where A thabaskan  blew up. Their war 
diary notes gun  flashes from the destroyer action 
and  a t 0416 hou rs  describes “a detonation with 
flam es an d  clouds of sm oke,” followed a t 0427 
hours by “a detonation with huge clouds of flame 
v is ib le .”28 T h e se  re p o r ts  -  a n d  th e  tim es  
acco rded  the  explosions -  effectively refu te  
Dixon’s contention th a t MTB-677 had  to be near 
by A thabaskan  to describe the explosion in such  
detail.
Dixon also claim s th a t for MTB-677 to have 
se en  th e  se c o n d  e x p lo s io n  from  30  m iles 
d istance, it would have to have been  “over 525 
feet h igh ,” w hich he seem s to th in k  doubtful. 
B u t in  h e r  w ar diary, T-24, w hich w as eight 
m iles ea st of A th a b a ska n  a t the tim e, no ted  
“Colum ns of fire approxim ately 200 m etres high
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(Bb) w ith a big m ushroom  of heavy sm oke. 
A pparently  from b u rn in g  oil.” Not only did the 
G erm ans describe a n  explosion th a t  w as even 
g rea ter th a n  Dixon estim ated , b u t they  also 
conclude th a t  it cam e from  an  in te rnal source. 
(They also took a m easu re  of sa tisfac tion  a t 
the resu lt as they th en  exclaim ed, “In any case 
‘One wicked foe blown in the  air.’”)29
There are  techn ical inaccuracies th a t  also 
m ar Dixon’s version of events. For example, even 
if MTB-677 h ad  w anted  to close the  action, it is 
unlikely th a t it w ould have got there  in tim e to 
fit in to  h is tim e fram e. Time of origin and  tim e 
of re c e ip t  of s ig n a ls  d iffer, a n d  a lth o u g h  
Plym outh C om m and signalled the T ribals to 
in tercep t a t 0307 h ou rs, the  signal w as not 
m onitored in the MTB u n til 0315 hou rs, eight 
m inu tes  la te r th a n  Dixon s ta te s .30 Also, due  to 
additional top weight from increased arm am ent, 
ra d a r  and  o ther equ ipm ent fitted as  the  w ar 
progressed, the  ac tu a l con tinuous m axim um  
speed of Fairm ile D-type MTBs like MTB-677 
w as ab o u t 26-27 knots, no t the  30 th a t  Dixon 
ascribes to them .31 More im portantly , because  
of th re a ts  to the  reliability of th e ir powerful 
P ackard  engines as well as  the  physical toll on 
personnel caused  from su s ta in ed  pound ing  a t 
high speed, MTB crews -  like the fighter pilots -  
d id  n o t  p u s h  th e ir  p o w er p la n ts  a t  h ig h  
rev o lu tio n s  for any  longer th a n  a b so lu te ly  
necessary , and  certainly no t for the 55 m inu tes 
th a t Dixon allo tted  M TB-677.32 C onsequently, 
even if he had  closed the action, an  experienced 
C oastal Forces officer like C artw right would 
probably  only have done so a t the  20 kno ts  he 
later p u t on when Leatham  ordered him  to head  
to the  scene to rescue  survivors. If one takes 
th ese  d isc rep an c ies  of tim e a n d  speed  into 
account, MTB-677 could only have reached  the 
scene well after A th a b a ska n ’s dem ise. But, of 
course, th a t is all speculation as he r log already 
proves she w as no t there  a t all.
W hat abou t the th ird  rad a r echo th a t Haida  
and  A thabaskan  detected a t 0411 hou rs?  Peter 
Dixon m ain ta ins th a t it w as proof of M TB-677’s 
presence.33 It m ust be understood, however, th a t 
ra d a r  w as still in  its relative infancy in  1944, 
and it was not u n u su a l for ‘ghost’ or ‘side’ echoes 
to appear on A -scans and  PPI displays, or for 
o ther anom alies to occur. Two exam ples from  
a m o n g  m a n y  in  th e  r e c o r d s  o f s u r f a c e  
engagem ents in the English Channel during this
period provide evidence of th is. On the n igh t of 
2 5 /2 6  February  1944 a  g roup of sh ip s from 
P ly m o u th , in c lu d in g  H a id a , H uron  a n d  
Athabaskan, picked up  a  rad a r contact th a t was 
plotted a t eight miles range heading sou th  at nine 
k n o ts . W hen illu m in a ted  by s ta r  shell, th e  
co n tac t w as revealed to be a g roup  of very 
s ta tio n ary  islands, no t enem y w arsh ips!34 On 
an o th e r sweep th a t  led to an  engagem ent w ith 
th ree  G erm an destroyers on the n ight of 25 / 26 
April -  two n igh ts before A th a b a ska n  w as su n k  
-  th e  c ru is e r  HMS B la c k  Prince  a n d  th e  
destroyers H aida  an d  HMS A shan ti all initially 
detected four radar contacts, although only three 
G erm an sh ip s were p resen t.35 The fourth  w as a 
‘ghost’ or ‘side’ echo. This is also the m ost likely 
exp lanation  for H aida  an d  A th a b a ska n ’s th ird  
con tac t a t 0411 h o u rs  on 29 April. After th a t 
a c tio n , th re e  of H a id a ’s r a d a r  o p e ra to rs  
subsequen tly  reported  th a t  they  only ever saw  
two echoes, while a fourth  who acknowledged a 
th ird  echo identified it as a “side echo.”36 This is 
fu rther reinforced by the fact th a t neither Haida  
nor A thabaskan  seem s to have tracked the th ird  
echo, w hereas if it h ad  of been a firm contact, it 
would have been plotted by at least one of them .37 
Instead, it simply vanished, which suggests th a t 
an  actual contact never existed in the first place.
Unfortunately, perhaps because he believes 
so  s t r o n g ly  in  h is  th e o r y ,  D ix o n  a ls o  
m isrep resen ted  evidence from the report of the 
B oard of Inquiry. W hen referring to confusion 
over w hich sh ip  shou ld  get cred it for sinking 
A thabaskan , he wrote, “Yet th is  confusion is 
com pounded by the  s ta te m e n t in the  inqu iry ’s 
report th a t  the  m em bers of the  board  ‘did not 
c o n s id e r  [w h e th e r]  a n y  o th e r  s h ip s  w ere 
p resen t.’” Dixon’s insertion of the word ‘w hether’ 
in to  th e  q u o te  fu n d a m e n ta lly  c h a n g e d  its  
m eaning. He h a s  the  board  reporting  th a t  they 
did no t investigate if any  vessels besides the 
two G erm an  destroyers were a t the  scene of 
the engagem ent, when, in  fact, they were saying 
th a t they did no t th in k  any  o ther vessels w ere  
p resen t. This is proved by the w itnesses they 
called a n d  the  q u es tio n s  they  posed  a t  the  
inquiry. The bo ard  asked  C om m ander DeWolf 
ab o u t the  th ird  rad a r  con tac t an d  w hether he 
th o u g h t any o ther sh ip s  were p resen t. They 
th e n  q u e s tio n e d  four r a d a r  o p e ra to rs  from  
Haida  an d  ano ther from  A thabaskan  abou t the 
th i r d  c o n ta c t .38 (The s a i lo r s  from  H a id a  
m ain ta ined  there  never w as a  th ird  contact,
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One hundred and twenty- 
eight young Canadian 
volunteers died with 
Athabaskan. This is an early 
grave marker erected in 
Plouescat, France.
while the  one from A th a b a ska n  sa id  th a t  h is 
se t broke down after the  first explosion.) Why 
else would they call rad ar operators from Haida 
u n less  they  were in te rested  in finding ou t w hat 
sh ip s  were p resen t?  The evidence they  hea rd  
led them  to conclude -  or, to u se  an o th e r word, 
c o n s id e r  -  th a t  no  s h ip s  b ey o n d  th e  two 
C an ad ian  an d  two G erm an  destroyers  were 
involved in  the  ac tion .39
deck a t the time, were queried abou t the second 
explosion. The board  in p a rticu la r w anted  to 
know  if any  sea  w ater w as throw n up  w ith the 
blast, evidence th a t it m ay have been caused  by 
a  torpedo. No w itness recalled any sea  water, 
they mostly refer to large am ounts of flame. Only 
one w itness, L ieu tenan t J.W. Scott, RCNVR, 
th o u g h t  a  to rp e d o  h i t  c a u se d  th e  se co n d  
explosion:
In d iscussing  the inquiry, Dixon also writes 
“Eyew itness accoun ts  have A th a b a ska n  being 
to rp e d o e d  tw ice  on  th e  p o r t  s id e . T h is  
exp lanation  seem s to have been  d iscoun ted  by 
the  B oard.” Dixon is correct in  th a t  conclusion, 
b u t  it is im portan t to recognize th a t  the board  
did exam ine the  possibility  of two torpedoes 
h itt in g  A th a b a ska n . In doing so th ey  were 
following u p  a p re lim in ary  investiga tion  by 
C aptain  D Plym outh, C om m ander R.A. Morice, 
RN based  on h is inform al conversations w ith 
25 survivors. “Shortly  after the  first dam age,” 
he wrote, “ a heavier and  more violent explosion 
was felt am idships. This is believed to have been 
e ither the  b las t of a torpedo or heavy calibre 
shell fire.”40 The board  p u rsu e d  th is  m a tte r  a t 
the  inquiry. Nine of A th a b a ska n ’s survivors, 
all of whom  h a d  previously talked  w ith Morice 
an d  who all appear to have been  on the  u pper
Q: T he seco n d  exp losion , do y o u  re m em b er 
see ing  it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do y o u  k now  w h ich  side?
A: O n th e  s ta rb o a rd  side. T h a t w as  a  defin ite  
to rp ed o  b e c a u se  th e  w hole sh ip  j u s t  seem ed  to  
fall a p a r t .41
The o ther w itnesses corroborate only S co tt’s 
obse rv a tio n  th a t  the  second  explosion  w as 
devastating b u t descriptions of its precise origin 
vary.
T ak ing  th is  ev idence in to  ac co u n t, the  
board  reached  the  following conclusion:
The fact th a t  th is  h it stopped  th e  sh ip  an d  cau sed  
a  heavy  j a r  all over th e  sh ip  seem s to  show  th a t  
it  m u s t  h av e  b e e n  c a u se d  by  so m e th in g  m ore 
th a n  h i t s  fro m  4 .1  p ro je c ti le s  a n d  w o u ld ,
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th e re fo re , a p p e a r  to  h av e  b e e n  c a u s e d  b y  a  
to rp ed o  fired  by  th e  enem y  w h en  th e y  tu rn e d  
a t  a b o u t 0 414 . T h is  ag rees  ap p ro x im ate ly  w ith  
th e  ru n n in g  tim e  of a  40  k n o t to rp ed o  so  fired.
T h is sh o t s to p p ed  th e  sh ip , w h ich  h a d  ju s t  
a lte red  cou rse  30 e to  port, a n d  te n  m in u te s  la te r 
s h e  s u s ta in e d  a  se c o n d  a n d  m u c h  h e a v ie r  
exp losion , i.e. a t  0427 .
T h is m ay  have  b een  c a u se d  by
a) a  to rpedo , or
b) th e  exp losion  of th e  a fte r  4" m agaz ine .
In  s u p p o r t  of (a) th e  r a d a r  p lo t sh o w s a n  
a p p a re n t j in k  to th e  so u th w a rd s  b e tw een  04 2 0  
a n d  0 4 2 2  of th e  E lb ing  d es tro y e r w ho w as  n o t 
engaged  by  H aida . A to rp ed o  fired  o n  th is  j in k  
a t  th e  sta tionary  an d  b u rn in g  A th ab ask an  w ould 
have arrived  a t  a b o u t 0427 . The E lb ing  engaged 
by  HMCS H aid a  w as  a lso  in  a  p o s itio n  from  
w h ich  sh e  m igh t have  fired to rpedoes, a lth o u g h  
th is  w ould  en ta il a  long sh o t fired well ab a ft h e r  
beam .
In  s u p p o r t of (b) th e  a fte r  4" m ag az in e  h a d  
b e e n  close to  a  very  s e r io u s  fire for a  p e riod  of 
te n  m in u te s . T he exp losion  of th is  m agaz ine  
w o u ld  h av e  th ro w n  b u rn in g  oil u p  a n d  fa r 
enough  forward, to have cau sed  th e  flam es w hich 
w e re  e x p e r ie n c e d  b y  th e  s h i p ’s  c o m p a n y  
am id sh ip  a n d  n e a r  th e  bridge.
In  view  of th e  ev idence of m e n  w ho w ere in  
N o.2 bo ile r room , w h ich  th ey  left in ta c t, th e  
second  explosion m u s t have occu rred  in  or abaft 
th e  eng ine  room .
We do n o t co n s id e r th a t  a n y  o th e r  enem y 
s h ip s  w ere  p re s e n t,  b e s id e s  th e  tw o E lb in g  
d e s tro y e rs  m en tio n ed  th e  H a id a ’s  rep o rt, a n d  
th a t  th e  to rp ed o  o r to rp ed o es  w h ich  h it th e  
A th a b a sk a n  w ere fired  by  th e m .42
There is no question th a t events on the night 
of 28 / 29 April 1944 were confused. But we know 
now through the exam ination of Germ an records 
th a t T-24 an d  T-27 did no t fire any additional 
torpedoes after their initial salvo, an d  we also 
know  th a t  no o ther G erm an vessels were in the 
im m ediate vicinity of the action. T hat elim inates 
a second G erm an torpedo as the  cause  of the 
m assive explosion a t 0427 h ou rs. Searching  
fu rther for the source of a second torpedo, Peter 
Dixon chose to b lam e M TB-677, b u t  w hen his 
case is exam ined closely, it is clear th a t  the 
evidence against it is overwhelming, leading one 
to conclude th a t  the  theory  is flat ou t wrong. 
T hat leaves an  in te rn a l explosion as the cause  
of the  second explosion, and  no one can  deny 
th a t w ith heavy s tru c tu ra l dam age, a m assive 
fire  b u r n in g  o u t  of c o n tro l , a n d  v o la tile  
m a te r ia ls  c lo se  by, th e  e le m e n ts  fo r th e
c a ta s t r o p h ic  e x p lo s io n  t h a t  d e v a s ta te d  
A th a b a ska n  th a t  April n ight were there.
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